Information revelation in auctions with common and private values

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.006zbMath1347.91165OpenAlexW2344371831MaRDI QIDQ290172

Xu Tan

Publication date: 1 June 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyauctionsinformation revelationtwo-dimensional values

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Information revelation in auctions
• Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions
• The value of information in a sealed-bid auction
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Sequential Equilibria
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
• Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

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