Multidimensional private value auctions
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Publication:2490121
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.002zbMath1108.91027OpenAlexW3124042344MaRDI QIDQ2490121
Publication date: 28 April 2006
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d14/d1423.pdf
2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)
Related Items (16)
Mechanism design with information acquisition ⋮ All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Information revelation in auctions with common and private values ⋮ Learning rivals' information in interdependent value auctions ⋮ Bad news can be good news: early dropouts in an English auction with multi-dimensional signals ⋮ Private versus complete information in auctions ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment ⋮ MONOPOLY INSURANCE AND ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests ⋮ The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions ⋮ On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study ⋮ Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction ⋮ Risk aversion in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders: a ``desensitizer from uncertainty ⋮ EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON ENGLISH AUCTIONS: ORAL OUTCRY VERSUS CLOCK ⋮ An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
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