First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:1602002)
Recommendations
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
Cited in
(16)- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
- Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts
- Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- Signal jamming in a sequential auction
This page was built for publication: First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1602002)
