First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
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Publication:1602002
DOI10.1007/S100580100039zbMATH Open1005.91055OpenAlexW3125006072MaRDI QIDQ1602002FDOQ1602002
Shmuel Zamir, Michael Landsberger, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Jacob Rubinstein
Publication date: 1 July 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100039
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Cited In (14)
- Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
- Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale
- First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions
- Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Signal jamming in a sequential auction
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
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