First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge

DOI10.1007/S100580100039zbMATH Open1005.91055OpenAlexW3125006072MaRDI QIDQ1602002FDOQ1602002

Shmuel Zamir, Michael Landsberger, Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Jacob Rubinstein

Publication date: 1 July 2002

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580100039

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (13)

• Qualitative analysis of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in weak asymmetric auctions
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Unraveling of value-rankings in auctions with resale
• First-price auctions where one of the bidders' valuations is common knowledge
• The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
• Signal jamming in a sequential auction
• Multidimensional private value auctions
• Dual sourcing with price discovery
• Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction

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