Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
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Publication:533941
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.12.004zbMATH Open1211.91132OpenAlexW1974665451MaRDI QIDQ533941FDOQ533941
Authors: Harrison H. C. Cheng 
Publication date: 10 May 2011
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004
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Cites Work
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
Cited In (13)
- On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
- Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
- Competition May reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
- Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
- When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
- Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
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