Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.12.004MaRDI QIDQ533941zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date 10 May 2011

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryfirst-price auctionsprivate valuerevenue effect

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Cites work

• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
• Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Cited in

(15)

• On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets
• Asymmetric first-price menu auctions under intricate uncertainty
• A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
• Competition May reduce the revenue in a first price auction with affiliated private values
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• On asymmetric reserve prices
• Revenue in first-price auctions with a buy-out price and risk-averse bidders
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format

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