Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1137/17M1140200zbMATH Open1390.91142OpenAlexW3124354509WikidataQ129804512 ScholiaQ129804512MaRDI QIDQ4643774FDOQ4643774

Authors: Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Nir Gavish 

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/17m1140200

Recommendations

• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryaveraginghomogenizationasymptotic methodssecond-price auctionrevenue equivalenceauction theoryfirst-price auctionasymmetric auctionoptimal auctionrevenue rankingLaplace method for integrals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Cited In (9)

• A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem
• A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
• Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

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