Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions
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Publication:4643774
DOI10.1137/17M1140200zbMath1390.91142OpenAlexW3124354509WikidataQ129804512 ScholiaQ129804512MaRDI QIDQ4643774
Arieh Gavious, Gadi Fibich, Nir Gavish
Publication date: 29 May 2018
Published in: SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1137/17m1140200
game theoryhomogenizationasymptotic methodsaveragingrevenue rankingsecond-price auctionrevenue equivalencefirst-price auctionauction theoryasymmetric auctionoptimal auctionLaplace method for integrals
Cites Work
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
- Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
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- Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
- Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
- Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
- Ranking asymmetric auctions
- The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
- An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions
- A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach
- Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
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