Revenue equivalence of large asymmetric auctions

DOI10.1137/17M1140200MaRDI QIDQ4643774zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious, Nir Gavish

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/17m1140200

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryaveraginghomogenizationasymptotic methodssecond-price auctionrevenue equivalenceauction theoryfirst-price auctionasymmetric auctionoptimal auctionrevenue rankingLaplace method for integrals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions

Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric First-Price Auctions—A Perturbation Approach
• Asymmetry and revenue in first-price auctions
• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Auctions with almost homogeneous bidders
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
• Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
• Numerical analysis of asymmetric first price auctions
• Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
• Numerical solutions of asymmetric, first-price, independent private values auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Ranking asymmetric auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

Cited in

(9)

• A measure of the variability of revenue in auctions: A look at the revenue equivalence theorem
• A note on the effect of asymmetry on revenue in second-price auctions
• Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Revenue equivalence in asymmetric auctions
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
• Revenue comparison in asymmetric auctions with discrete valuations
• When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions

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