A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition

DOI10.2307/2296904zbMath0373.90012MaRDI QIDQ4152301

Robert Wilson

Publication date: 1977

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296904

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B60: Trade models

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

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