A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4152301
DOI10.2307/2296904zbMath0373.90012OpenAlexW2078234023MaRDI QIDQ4152301
Publication date: 1977
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2296904
Related Items (50)
Rates of information aggregation in common value auctions ⋮ Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Reputation in repeated second-price auctions ⋮ Matching in the large: an experimental study ⋮ Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions ⋮ On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions ⋮ Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions ⋮ Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation ⋮ Maxmin mechanism in a simple common value auction ⋮ A common‐value auction with state‐dependent participation ⋮ I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions ⋮ Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Trade of a common value good ⋮ Information and strategic behavior ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals ⋮ Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders ⋮ Are there common values in first-price auctions? A tail-index nonparametric test ⋮ Updating toward the signal ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets ⋮ Auctions ⋮ Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions ⋮ Price-region bids in electricity markets ⋮ Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire ⋮ Aggregation and design of information in asset markets with adverse selection ⋮ An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information ⋮ Large auctions with risk-averse bidders ⋮ Convergence results for unanimous voting ⋮ Multidimensional private value auctions ⋮ The set of equilibria of first-price auctions ⋮ Jury theorems with multiple alternatives ⋮ Equilibrium transformations and the revenue equivalence theorem ⋮ The relative contributions of private information sharing and public information releases to information aggregation ⋮ On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions ⋮ Revenue comparison of discrete private-value auctions via weak dominance ⋮ Auctions of heterogeneous objects ⋮ Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids ⋮ Information aggregation in a financial market with general signal structure ⋮ Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions ⋮ Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information ⋮ Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions ⋮ Revisiting the convergence theorem for competitive bidding in common value auctions ⋮ Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders ⋮ Large Asymmetric First-Price Auctions---A Boundary-Layer Approach ⋮ Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature ⋮ Common-value auctions with discrete private information
This page was built for publication: A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
