On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.011zbMATH Open1142.91484OpenAlexW2064250017MaRDI QIDQ869877FDOQ869877
Authors: Matthew O. Jackson, Ilan Kremer 
Publication date: 9 March 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79618/
Recommendations
asymptotic efficiencycompetitionefficient marketsauctionefficient market hypothesisdiscriminatory auction
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
Cited In (9)
- The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
- Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
- Price discrimination with partial information: does it pay off?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
- Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: an argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
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