On the informational inefficiency of discriminatory price auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2004.06.011MaRDI QIDQ869877zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Matthew O. Jackson, Ilan Kremer

Publication date 9 March 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79618/

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic efficiencycompetitionefficient marketsauctionefficient market hypothesisdiscriminatory auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521
• Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
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• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
• The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment
• The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue

Cited in

(10)

• The expected stop-out price in a discriminating auction
• Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
• Auction mechanisms for allocating subsidies for carbon emissions reduction: an experimental investigation
• Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions
• Price discrimination with partial information: does it pay off?
• Discriminatory price auctions with resale and optimal quantity caps
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• Eliciting demand information through cheap talk: an argument in favor of a ban on price discrimination
• Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions

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