Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
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Publication:4530998
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00178zbMATH Open1021.91019OpenAlexW1988299172MaRDI QIDQ4530998FDOQ4530998
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00178
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Cited In (28)
- Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
- Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects
- Large auctions with risk-averse bidders
- Fuzzy formulation of auctions and optimal sequencing for multiple auctions.
- Auctions for social lending: a theoretical analysis
- College assignment as a large contest
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions
- Renewable auctions: bidding for real options
- Selling shares to retail investors: auction vs. fixed price
- I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions
- Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
- Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
- Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
- The efficiency of competitive mechanisms under private information
- Interconnected pay-as-bid auctions
- The private value single item bisection auction
- Towards a characterization of worst case equilibria in the discriminatory price auction
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
- Large multi-unit auctions with a large bidder
- Revenue Equivalence of Large Asymmetric Auctions
- Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
- Efficiency and information aggregation in large uniform-price auctions
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