The private value single item bisection auction
DOI10.1007/S00199-005-0032-ZzbMATH Open1119.91038OpenAlexW2013405413MaRDI QIDQ852323FDOQ852323
Authors: N. E. Zubov 
Publication date: 29 November 2006
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/5c973ca6-c1bb-41e5-afff-b6d300f2f88c
Recommendations
- Auctions with both common-value and private-value bidders
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Auctioning divisible goods
- Auctions of heterogeneous objects
- An efficient ascending auction for private valuations
- Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
- The discrete bid first auction
- Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions
- Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
information revelationbinary searchEnglish auctionbisection auctionextensive form games of incomplete informationsingle item auctionVickrey auctionweakly dominant strategy
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10)
Cites Work
Cited In (12)
- Multi-item Vickrey-English-Dutch auctions
- On communication protocols that compute almost privately
- The communication cost of selfishness
- Polyhedral clinching auctions for two-sided markets
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- Fraction auctions: the tradeoff between efficiency and running time
- The communication complexity of private value single-item auctions
- A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences
- Asking questions
- On the fastest Vickrey algorithm
- Dynamic communication mechanism design
- One man, one bid
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