Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.05.006MaRDI QIDQ2473059zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pierre Fleckinger

Publication date 26 February 2008

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

communicationdichotomyincentive compatibilitysingle-peaked preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Cheap talk can matter in bargaining
• Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
• Long Cheap Talk
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• The communication cost of selfishness
• The private value single item bisection auction

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