Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
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Publication:697846
DOI10.1006/JETH.2001.2829zbMATH Open1051.91011OpenAlexW1971335524MaRDI QIDQ697846FDOQ697846
Authors: Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2829
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Cites Work
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- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
- A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules
- The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules
- Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
Cited In (33)
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- A characterization of random min-max domains and its applications
- Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences
- On the equivalence of strategy-proofness and upper contour strategy-proofness for randomized social choice functions
- A unified characterization of the randomized strategy-proof rules
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- One-sided version of Gale-Shapley proposal algorithm and its likely behavior under random preferences
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
- Random dictatorship domains
- Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains
- Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication
- Probabilistic fixed ballot rules and hybrid domains
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Threshold voting leads to type-revelation
- Fully sincere voting
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
- On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals
- Stochastic same-sidedness in the random voting model
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
- Unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic rules for single-peaked preference profiles on graphs
- New characterizations of strategy-proofness under single-peakedness
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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