Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes

DOI10.1007/S355-002-8331-1MaRDI QIDQ2567906zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dolors Berga

Publication date 14 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8331-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(19)

• Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
• On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
• Generalized median voter schemes and committees
• Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
• SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
• Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference
• Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
• Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
• Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
• Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences

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