Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
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Publication:2567906
DOI10.1007/S355-002-8331-1zbMATH Open1072.91540OpenAlexW2080471362MaRDI QIDQ2567906FDOQ2567906
Authors: Dolors Berga 
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8331-1
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- Application of generalized median voter schemes to designing strategy-proof mechanisms of multicriteria active expertise
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
- SINGLE PEAKED FUZZY PREFERENCES IN ONE-DIMENSIONAL MODELS: DOES BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM HOLD?
- Strategy-proof voting scheme under single-peak preference
- Single-crossing, strategic voting and the median choice rule
- Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
- The structure of strategy-proof social choice. I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Top monotonicity: a common root for single peakedness, single crossing and the median voter result
- Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences
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