Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0700-4MaRDI QIDQ2453417zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shuhei Morimoto

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/13700

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
• Probabilistic strategy-proof rules over single-peaked domains

Cites work

• A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
• A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
• Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes
• On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
• Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
• Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes
• Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
• Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
• Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Voting by Committees

Cited in

(6)

• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Approximate efficiency and strategy-proofness for moneyless mechanisms on single-dipped policy domain
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
• Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: a maximal domain for possibility
• Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies
• An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains

This page was built for publication: Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2453417)