Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
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Cited in
(28)- Fully sincere voting
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Probabilistic, fuzzy and rough concepts in social choice
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- On random social choice functions with the tops-only property
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- A general concept of majority rule
- Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
- Salvador Barberà
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
- Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
- Parametrized algorithms for random serial dictatorship
- Recent Results on Strategy-Proofness of Random Social Choice Functions
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- A natural adaptive process for collective decision-making
- Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
- Consistency of decision processes
- A cardinal approach to straightforward probabilistic mechanisms
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Symmetry and impartial lotteries
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