Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes
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Cites work
- A geometric proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An alternative direct proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem
- An alternative proof of Gibbard's random dictatorship result
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness
- Probabilistic Borda rule voting
- Proving the incompatibility of efficiency and strategyproofness via SMT solving
- Random dictatorship domains
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
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