A new solution to the random assignment problem.
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Fair solutions to the random assignment problem
- The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
- On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
- On cores and indivisibility
- Ordinal efficiency and dominated sets of assignments.
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains
- Truthful fair division without free disposal
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Fair-by-design matching
- Random assignments of bundles
- Size versus truncation robustness in the assignment problem
- Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in marriage problems
- A new version of Menages problem.
- Fairness and efficiency of the random serial dictatorship on preference domains with a tier structure
- On slots' scheduling
- Equivalence of efficiency notions for ordinal assignment problems
- Symmetric mechanism design
- A marriage matching mechanism menagerie
- Scheduling with Opting Out: Improving upon Random Priority
- The equivalence between random priority and probabilistic serial rule on restricted preference domains
- Agent-wise-replication invariance for random allocations
- A pessimist's approach to one-sided matching
- Allocation without transfers: a welfare-maximizing mechanism under incomplete information
- Reclaim-proof allocation of indivisible objects
- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
- An efficiency theorem for incompletely known preferences
- Market Design
- Fair assignment of indivisible objects under ordinal preferences
- Handling preferences in student-project allocation
- On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
- Trading probabilities along cycles
- Corrigendum to: ``Random assignment: redefining the serial rule
- On the efficiency and fairness of deferred acceptance with single tie-breaking
- Ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational assignments in housing markets with interdependent values
- A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
- Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
- Popular mixed matchings
- Pairwise kidney exchange
- Bounded incentives in manipulating the probabilistic serial rule
- Guaranteed size ratio of ordinally efficient and envy-free mechanisms in the assignment problem
- Decomposing random mechanisms
- On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment
- Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
- Randomized strategyproof mechanisms with best of both worlds fairness and efficiency
- Inefficiency of random serial dictatorship under incomplete information
- Note on Gale's conjecture in one-sided matching problems
- Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
- Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
- Fair student placement
- Convex strategyproofness with an application to the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences
- Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism
- Fairness and efficiency for allocations with participation constraints
- Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures
- Robust ex-post Pareto efficiency and fairness in random assignments: two impossibility results
- On best-of-both-worlds fair-share allocations
- A planner-optimal matching mechanism and its incentive compatibility in a restricted domain
- Making just school assignments
- Fuzzy weighted equilibrium multi-job assignment problem and genetic algorithm
- Random aggregation without the Pareto principle
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- A note on object allocation under lexicographic preferences
- Efficient lottery design
- A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints
- Outside options in neutral allocation of discrete resources
- Short trading cycles: paired kidney exchange with strict ordinal preferences
- Size versus truthfulness in the house allocation problem
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing
- Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
- Peeking behind the ordinal curtain: improving distortion via cardinal queries
- Extended random assignment mechanisms on a family of good sets
- Game-theoretically secure protocols for the ordinal random assignment problem
- Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests
- Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral separating hyperplane theorem
- The ``Boston school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
- Strategic experimentation with random serial dictatorship
- Submodular optimization views on the random assignment problem
- Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
- A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
- Random serial dictatorship: the one and only
- Agent-wise-replication invariance, the Walrasian solution and the uniform rule
- Computational complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser mechanism for one-sided matching markets
- Upper-contour strategy-proofness in the probabilistic assignment problem
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities
- Popularity, Mixed Matchings, and Self-Duality
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems
- A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
- Ordinal allocation
- Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
- Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
- Fractional group identification
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model
- Smoothed and average-case approximation ratios of mechanisms: beyond the worst-case analysis
- Sequential school choice: theory and evidence from the field and lab
- The object allocation problem with favoring upper ranks
- Stable matching: An integer programming approach
- Probabilistic assignment of objects: characterizing the serial rule
This page was built for publication: A new solution to the random assignment problem.
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5958895)
