Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.01.003MaRDI QIDQ2462289zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mihai Manea

Publication date 30 November 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

ex post Pareto optimalitymany-objects-to-one-agent allocation problemserial dictatorship games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites work

• A new solution to the random assignment problem.
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• On cores and indivisibility
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods

Cited in

(18)

• Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
• Serial dictatorship and unmatch reduction: a problem of Japan's nursery school choice
• Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
• Matching and scheduling of student-company-talks for a university it-speed dating event
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
• Matching with quorums
• A note on the serial dictatorship with project closures
• New algorithm for checking Pareto optimality in bimatrix games
• Serial dictatorship: the unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
• Only a dictatorship is efficient
• Serial dictatorship vs. Nash in assessing Pareto optimality in many-to-many matchings with an application in water management
• Multi-agent task allocation under unrestricted environments
• Optimizing over serial dictatorships
• Efficient matching under general constraints
• Optimizing over serial dictatorships
• Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
• Centralized allocation in multiple markets

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