Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.003zbMath1271.91031OpenAlexW1969256613MaRDI QIDQ2462289

Mihai Manea

Publication date: 30 November 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

ex post Pareto optimalitymany-objects-to-one-agent allocation problemserial dictatorship games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Discrete-time games (91A50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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Cites Work

• On cores and indivisibility
• On a conjecture by Gale about one-sided matching problems
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.