Centralized allocation in multiple markets
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Recommendations
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- Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
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- Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets
- Centralized resource allocation for enhanced Russell models
- Mechanisms for a spatially distributed market
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3545398 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1305096 (Why is no real title available?)
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Assignment problems with complementarities
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- House allocation with existing tenants
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Microeconomic theory
- On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods
- Room assignment-rent division: a market approach
- School choice with neighbors
- Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- Strategyproof single unit award rules
- The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
Cited in
(9)- The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
- Decentralized allocation of resources among many producers
- Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
- Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
- Strategy-proof exchange under trichotomous preferences
- A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences
- Multi resource allocation with partial preferences
- On the operation of multiple matching markets
- Preference revelation games and strict cores of multiple‐type housing market problems
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