Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
DOI10.1007/S00712-022-00793-9zbMATH Open1518.91089OpenAlexW4283033267MaRDI QIDQ6100993FDOQ6100993
Authors: Hong-Ren Din, Chia-Hung Sun 
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00793-9
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vertically-related marketstwo-part pricing contractcentralized Nash bargainingdecentralized Nash bargainingendogenous strategic variables
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
- Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly
- Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
- Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly
- Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
- Endogenous timing in vertically-related markets
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study
- Price vs. quantity competition in vertically related markets. Generalization
- Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
- Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market revisited
- Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly
Cited In (6)
- Centralized allocation in multiple markets
- Alternative forms of buyer power in a vertical duopoly: implications for profits, welfare, and cost pass-through
- A simulation model of the price bargaining rules in vertical relationships
- Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the ``law of one price
- Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
- Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures
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