Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
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Publication:6100993
DOI10.1007/s00712-022-00793-9zbMath1518.91089OpenAlexW4283033267MaRDI QIDQ6100993
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-022-00793-9
vertically-related marketstwo-part pricing contractcentralized Nash bargainingdecentralized Nash bargainingendogenous strategic variables
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
- Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly
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- Decentralized versus collective bargaining -- an experimental study
- Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
- Price vs. quantity competition in vertically related markets. Generalization
- Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
- Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market revisited
- Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly
- Endogenous timing in vertically-related markets
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Optimal Fiscal Regime in a Spatial Duopoly
- Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly
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