Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.11.026zbMath1396.91427OpenAlexW2185392056MaRDI QIDQ1667995

Leonard F. S. Wang, Debasmita Basak

Publication date: 31 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa24947

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingtwo-part tariffswelfareBertrandCournotvertical pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (9)

Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures ⋮ What role should public firms play in the upstream market? ⋮ Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices ⋮ Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare ⋮ A coordination mechanism of supply chain with a retailer and two competitive suppliers ⋮ Price versus quantity competition in a vertically related market with retailer's effort ⋮ Fixed fee discounts and Bertrand competition in vertically related markets ⋮ Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining ⋮ Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case

Cites Work

• Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
• On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
• A note on price and quantity competition in differentiated oligopolies
• Vertical Relationships between Manufacturers and Retailers: Inference with Limited Data

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