Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case
DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2017-0176OpenAlexW2903911020WikidataQ128813021 ScholiaQ128813021MaRDI QIDQ2098993FDOQ2098993
Authors: Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti 
Publication date: 22 November 2022
Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0176
Recommendations
- Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
- The relative profitability of Nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
- Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
- Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
- Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
- A note on the equivalence of the conjectural variations solution and the coefficient of cooperation
Cited In (6)
- Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?
- Non-rigid wages and merger profitability reversal under convex costs and centralized unionization
- Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
- Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
- Monopoly unions versus efficient bargaining with free entry
- Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures
This page was built for publication: Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2098993)
