Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures

DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00772-6MaRDI QIDQ2163086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Domenico Buccella, Luciano Fanti

Publication date 10 August 2022

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00772-6

zbMATH Keywords

conjectural variation modeldecentralized/semi-coordinated bargainingright-to-manage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
• Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
• Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
• Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
• Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market revisited

Cites work

• A note on the equivalence of the conjectural variations solution and the coefficient of cooperation
• Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
• Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
• Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
• Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
• Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case
• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices
• Vertical contract and competition intensity in Hotelling's model

Cited in

(7)

• Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs
• A note on the effects of downstream efficiency on upstream pricing
• Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
• Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
• Vertical cross‐ownership, input price discrimination, and social welfare
• Double markups under bilateral vertical contracting
• Alternative forms of buyer power in a vertical duopoly: implications for profits, welfare, and cost pass-through

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