Profits under centralized negotiations: the efficient bargaining case
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Recommendations
- Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
- The relative profitability of Nash bargaining on the labour demand curve or the contract curve
- Downstream rivals' competition, bargaining, and welfare
- Bargaining power and firm profits in asymmetric duopoly: an inverted-U relationship
- Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
Cites work
- A note on the equivalence of the conjectural variations solution and the coefficient of cooperation
- Cournot vs. Bertrand under centralised bargaining
- Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
- Informal incentive labour contracts and product market competition
- Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market
Cited in
(6)- Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency?
- Non-rigid wages and merger profitability reversal under convex costs and centralized unionization
- Centralized or decentralized bargaining in a vertically-related market with endogenous price/quantity choices
- Industry profits and competition under bilateral oligopoly
- Monopoly unions versus efficient bargaining with free entry
- Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures
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