A bargaining model of endogenous procedures
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Publication:2361514
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-1002-zzbMath1392.91095OpenAlexW3121460446WikidataQ110167416 ScholiaQ110167416MaRDI QIDQ2361514
Carlo Prato, Razvan Vlaicu, Daniel Diermeier
Publication date: 30 June 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1002-z
History, political science (91F10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (4)
The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power ⋮ Inequality, participation, and polarization ⋮ BARGAINING OVER TAXES AND ENTITLEMENTS IN THE ERA OF UNEQUAL GROWTH ⋮ Recognition without replacement in legislative bargaining
Cites Work
- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
- Order restricted preferences and majority rule
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: a dynamic model of endogenous political power
- Recognition for sale
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- Voting rules and efficiency in one-dimensional bargaining games with endogenous protocol
- Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
- Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
- Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
- Predictability and Power in Legislative Bargaining
- Executive Control and Legislative Success
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