Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
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Publication:1420880
DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00087-5zbMath1069.91033OpenAlexW2148444925MaRDI QIDQ1420880
Publication date: 23 January 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00087-5
Minimax problems in mathematical programming (90C47) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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Cites Work
- Order restricted preferences and majority rule
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
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