A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
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Publication:891336
DOI10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8zbMath1388.91101OpenAlexW1966561534MaRDI QIDQ891336
Publication date: 17 November 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8
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Cites Work
- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
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- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
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- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
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- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
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