A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model

DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0460-8zbMATH Open1388.91101OpenAlexW1966561534MaRDI QIDQ891336FDOQ891336

Authors: Seok-ju Cho, John Duggan 

Publication date: 17 November 2015

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0460-8

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
• Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
• Repeated Downsian electoral competition
• A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games

Cited In (6)

• Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
• Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
• Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
• On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
• Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players

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