A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model
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Cites work
- A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining.
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Cited in
(6)- Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining
- Folk theorems in a bargaining game with endogenous protocol
- On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors
- Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
- Veto players and equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
- Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: existence with three players
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