Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for 1 and a folk theorem
DOI10.3982/ECTA9004zbMATH Open1271.91063OpenAlexW3122220592MaRDI QIDQ3165271FDOQ3165271
Authors: Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille 
Publication date: 26 October 2012
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9004
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Cited In (34)
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- Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
- Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
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- Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring
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- Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
- Optimizing over pure stationary equilibria in consensus stopping games
- Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents
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- Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations
- On the strategic equivalence of linear dynamic and repeated games
- Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
- Limit equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games
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