Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
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Publication:3165271
DOI10.3982/ECTA9004zbMath1271.91063OpenAlexW3122220592MaRDI QIDQ3165271
Johannes Hörner, Takuo Sugaya, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille
Publication date: 26 October 2012
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9004
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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