Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
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Publication:6194372
DOI10.3982/te2680OpenAlexW4391139431MaRDI QIDQ6194372
Publication date: 19 March 2024
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2680
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