Repeated Games with Frequent Signals*
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Publication:5850901
DOI10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.233zbMath1182.91035MaRDI QIDQ5850901
David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 20 January 2010
Published in: Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3160491
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