A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

DOI10.3982/TE1512zbMath1395.91034OpenAlexW1545037858MaRDI QIDQ4586083

Thomas Wiseman, Marcin Pęski

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1512

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamesfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (5)

On the Strategic Equivalence of Linear Dynamic and Repeated Games ⋮ Stochastic Games ⋮ Markov Games with Frequent Actions and Incomplete Information—The Limit Case ⋮ Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality

Cites Work

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• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
• Repeated Games with Frequent Signals^*

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