A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes

DOI10.3982/TE1512zbMATH Open1395.91034OpenAlexW1545037858MaRDI QIDQ4586083FDOQ4586083

Authors: Marcin Pęski, Thomas Wiseman 

Publication date: 11 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1512

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zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremstochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Game theory
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Repeated games with frequent signals
• Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Cited In (11)

• Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon
• Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs
• Stochastic games with hidden states
• Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Stochastic games
• On the strategic equivalence of linear dynamic and repeated games

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