A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2014.03.007zbMATH Open1296.91019OpenAlexW1963975312MaRDI QIDQ2016219FDOQ2016219

Authors: Katsuhiko Aiba 

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007

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zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamefolk theoremdiscounted payoffalmost-perfect monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Noncooperative Stochastic Games
• Discounted Dynamic Programming
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Learning-by-doing, organizational forgetting, and industry dynamics
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma

Cited In (10)

• A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon
• Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for \(\delta \rightarrow 1\) and a folk theorem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
• Stochastic games with hidden states
• The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
• Stochastic games
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring

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