A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
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Publication:2016219
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007zbMath1296.91019MaRDI QIDQ2016219
Publication date: 19 June 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.007
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A15: Stochastic games, stochastic differential games
91A25: Dynamic games
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Cites Work
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- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
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- Discounted Dynamic Programming
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- Noncooperative Stochastic Games