A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
A stochastic game on infinite horizon is considered where each player gets a noisy information about the others' moves. Under suitable technical hypotheses, which include in particular the conditions that (1) the initial condition will be `forgotten' in a precise sense, (2) the information about the others' moves is sufficiently informative, and (3) the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1, it is shown that every individually rational feasible discounted payoff is attainable, thereby establishing a version of the `folk theorem'.
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- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- A partial folk theorem for games with private learning
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- Efficiency results in \(N\) player games with imperfect private monitoring
- Private monitoring games and decisions under uncertainty
- Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
- Weakly belief-free equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Discounted Dynamic Programming
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- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
- A folk theorem for stochastic games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon
- Recursive methods in discounted stochastic games: an algorithm for 1 and a folk theorem
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- A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
- Stochastic games
- Stochastic games with hidden states
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring
- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
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