Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.002zbMATH Open1205.91030OpenAlexW3123991108MaRDI QIDQ625045FDOQ625045

Authors: George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski 

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002

Recommendations

• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Folk theorem in repeated games with private monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
• An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringbounded recall strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Repeated games with one-memory
• Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
• Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Infinite histories and steady orbits in repeated games
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall

Cited In (14)

• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Bounded memory folk theorem
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Bounded memory and incomplete information
• Recall and private monitoring
• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Variable temptations and black mark reputations
• Instability of belief-free equilibria

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