Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.11.002MaRDI QIDQ625045zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date 11 February 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesfolk theoremimperfect monitoringbounded recall strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Minority Game with Bounded Recall
• A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
• Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
• Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games
• Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
• Finitely many players with bounded recall in infinitely repeated games
• How Robust Is the Folk Theorem?^*
• Infinite histories and steady orbits in repeated games
• Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
• On the theory of repeated games with private information. I: Anti-folk theorem without communication
• Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
• Repeated games with \(M\)-period bounded memory (pure strategies)
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• Repeated games with one-memory
• Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium
• The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The repeated prisoner's dilemma with imperfect private monitoring

Cited in

(14)

• Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
• Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
• Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
• Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal
• Strategies that enforce linear payoff relationships under observation errors in repeated prisoner's dilemma game
• Bounded memory folk theorem
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Bounded memory and incomplete information
• Recall and private monitoring
• Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
• Restricted feedback in long term relationships
• Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring
• Variable temptations and black mark reputations
• Instability of belief-free equilibria

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