Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002zbMath1205.91030MaRDI QIDQ625045

George J. Mailath, Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 11 February 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

repeated games; folk theorem; imperfect monitoring; bounded recall strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Bounded memory folk theorem, Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information, Limited records and reputation bubbles, Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring, Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring, Variable temptations and black mark reputations, Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring, Instability of belief-free equilibria, Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal, Restricted feedback in long term relationships, Bounded memory and incomplete information, Recall and private monitoring, Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma

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