The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
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Publication:5307832
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00717.xzbMath1187.91024OpenAlexW2111555819MaRDI QIDQ5307832
Johannes Hörner, Wojciech Olszewski
Publication date: 18 September 2007
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.184.365
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