Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
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- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- Approximation of noncooperative semi-Markov games
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Complementarity and diagonal dominance in discounted stochastic games
- Construction of Nash equilibria in symmetric stochastic games of capital accumulation.
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
- Existence of Stationary Correlated Equilibria with Symmetric Information for Discounted Stochastic Games
- Existence of perfect equilibria in a class of multigenerational stochastic games of capital accumulation
- Fear of Miscoordination and the Robustness of Cooperation in Dynamic Global Games With Exit
- Finite memory and imperfect monitoring
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- Infinite dimensional analysis. A hitchhiker's guide.
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- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
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- Markov equilibria of stochastic games with complementarities
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- Measurable relations
- Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
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- On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points
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- Stochastic Games
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- Strategic intergenerational bequests with stochastic convex production
- Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games
- The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization
- The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Unemployment insurance with hidden savings
Cited in
(9)- Markov distributional equilibrium dynamics in games with complementarities and no aggregate risk
- Stochastic games of resource extraction
- A strategic dynamic programming method for studying short-memory equilibria of stochastic games with uncountable number of states
- Public information in Markov games
- Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
- Discontinuous stochastic games
- Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- Noisy stochastic games
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