Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:338213
DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0151-5zbMath1348.91022OpenAlexW295998915MaRDI QIDQ338213
Publication date: 4 November 2016
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0151-5
Related Items
Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games, Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames, Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games
- Markov stationary equilibria in stochastic supermodular games with imperfect private and public information
- The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation
- Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- Global Newton method for stochastic games
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Empirical implications of alternative models of firm dynamics
- Cyclic Markov equilibria in stochastic games
- Algorithms for finding repeated game equilibria
- Almost stationary \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in zero-sum stochastic games
- Construction of subgame-perfect mixed-strategy equilibria in repeated games
- Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
- Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities
- Discounted Stochastic Games With No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples
- A User's Guide to Solving Dynamic Stochastic Games Using the Homotopy Method
- Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
- Optimization and dynamical systems algorithms for finding equilibria of stochastic games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
- Corrigendum to “Discounted Stochastic Games With No Stationary Nash Equilibrium: Two Examples”
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
- International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
- Stochastic games with hidden states
- Computing Equilibria of Dynamic Games
- NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF NONOPTIMAL DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- The Big Match
- Quitting Games
- Stochastic Games
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
