Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
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Publication:2391868
DOI10.1007/S00186-013-0433-XzbMATH Open1271.91026OpenAlexW2090860674MaRDI QIDQ2391868FDOQ2391868
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Cites Work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3205836 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5050004 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited In (7)
- Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes
- Conditionally stationary equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
- Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games
- Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
- Fractal geometry of equilibrium payoffs in discounted supergames
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