Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2391868
DOI10.1007/s00186-013-0433-xzbMath1271.91026MaRDI QIDQ2391868
Publication date: 5 August 2013
Published in: Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-013-0433-x
Related Items
A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes, FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES, Elementary subpaths in discounted stochastic games, Subgame perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games, Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- On the computation of value correspondences for dynamic games
- Restricted feedback in long term relationships
- Conditionally stationary equilibria in discounted dynamic games
- Dimension and measures on sub-self-affine sets
- Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
- Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Strongly symmetric subgame perfect equilibria in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring and discounting
- Algorithms for finding repeated game equilibria
- Equilibrium paths in discounted supergames
- Optimal taxation with endogenously incomplete debt markets
- Non-cooperative games
- Discounted Stochastic Games
- Weakly Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games With Private Monitoring
- Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- Representation and Approximation of Noncooperative Sequential Games
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- Stationary Markov Equilibria
- Variational Analysis
- Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model
- Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework for Empirical Work
- Subgame-Perfect Equilibria for Stochastic Games
- Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition
- Computing Supergame Equilibria
- Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
- Stochastic Games
- Dynamic games with hidden actions and hidden states
