Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames

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Publication:1082232

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6zbMath0602.90020OpenAlexW2082524842MaRDI QIDQ1082232

Dilip Abreu

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6




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