Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
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Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games
Recommendations
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
- Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
- On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
- Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- An Inequality for Rearrangements
- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Game theory
- Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
- Multistage Games with Communication
- On Repeated Games with Complete Information
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
- Public information in Markov games
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
- Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
- Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
- The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
- The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
- When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?
Cited in
(9)- Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
- Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
- A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
- A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
- Identification of payoffs in repeated games
- Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
- Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
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