Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007zbMath1422.91093OpenAlexW2793334073MaRDI QIDQ1753681

Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesconcave gamesrecursive methodsprivate monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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