Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.007MaRDI QIDQ1753681zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky

Publication date 29 May 2018

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.007

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesrecursive methodsprivate monitoringconcave games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• An Inequality for Rearrangements
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
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• Game theory
• Introduction to repeated games with private monitoring
• Multistage Games with Communication
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• On the microeconomic foundations of linear demand for differentiated products
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• Public information in Markov games
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Robust predictions in games with incomplete information
• Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
• Tacit collusion in differentiated Cournot games
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The graph of Prisoners' Dilemma supergame payoffs as a function of the discount factor
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?

Cited in

(9)

• Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring
• A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
• Monitoring versus discounting in repeated games
• Recursive structure and equilibria in games with private monitoring
• Self-rejecting mechanisms
• Repeated games with almost-public monitoring
• A folk theorem for stochastic games with private almost-perfect monitoring
• Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
• Identification of payoffs in repeated games

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