Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints

DOI10.2307/2297565MaRDI QIDQ3773733zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date 1987

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2297565

zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand oligopoly games with capacity constraintsdiscountinginfinitely repeated gamesOptimal penal codesprice-setting supergames

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cited in

(18)

• The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• On the feasibility of maximal collusion
• Repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
• Optimal punishments with detection lags
• A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames
• Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs
• Determination of optimal penalties for antitrust violations in a dynamic setting
• Dynamic price competition with capacity constraints and a strategic buyer
• Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames
• Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry

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