Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints

DOI10.2307/2297565zbMath0634.90103OpenAlexW2035984424MaRDI QIDQ3773733

Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297565

zbMATH Keywords

discountinginfinitely repeated gamesBertrand oligopoly games with capacity constraintsOptimal penal codesprice-setting supergames

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (14)

DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER ⋮ Prisoners' dilemma in duopoly (super) games ⋮ The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames ⋮ Optimal punishments with detection lags ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule ⋮ A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames ⋮ On the feasibility of maximal collusion ⋮ Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: \(n\)-player games ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints ⋮ Taxation and the sustainability of collusion with asymmetric costs ⋮ Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation ⋮ Repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs

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