Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
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Publication:617349
DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0502-9zbMath1203.91089OpenAlexW2042904312MaRDI QIDQ617349
Publication date: 21 January 2011
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11044/1/MPRA_paper_11044.pdf
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (11)
Cheating and compensation in price-fixing cartels ⋮ The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements ⋮ Managerial collusive behavior under asymmetric incentive schemes ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ Technology licensing and collusion ⋮ A theoretical analysis of collusion involving technology licensing under diseconomies of scale ⋮ Patent protection and threat of litigation in oligopoly ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production ⋮ Price competition or price leadership ⋮ Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs
Cites Work
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- Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
- Bertrand games and sharing rules
- Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
- Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
- Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
- Bertrand without fudge
- Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with unit cost asymmetry
- Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs
- Excess Capacity and Collusion
- Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
- Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- The Determination of Price and Output Quotas in a Heterogeneous Cartel
- A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
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