Excess Capacity and Collusion
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Publication:3210324
DOI10.2307/2527159zbMath0722.90005OpenAlexW2067858235MaRDI QIDQ3210324
Raymond J. Deneckere, Carl Davidson
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/675.pdf
Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
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Strategic incentives in dynamic duopoly ⋮ Research of collusion, competition and the optimal control policy ⋮ Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry ⋮ Pricing strategy and collusion in a market with delay sensitivity ⋮ Competition and collusion with fixed output ⋮ Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames ⋮ R&D INVESTMENTS AS PREBARGAINING STRATEGIES ⋮ Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: An old debate with a new look ⋮ Dynamic Pricing of Peak Production ⋮ Dynamic capacity choice in a Bertrand-Edgeworth framework ⋮ Long-run Strategic Advertising and Short-run Bertrand Competition
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