Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.02.009MaRDI QIDQ2435898zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Susanne Goldlücke, Sebastian Kranz

Publication date 21 February 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesrenegotiationside paymentsoptimal penal codes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

• Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games

Cites work

• A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
• A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments

Cited in

(16)

• Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships
• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• Efficiency and renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting
• Partnerships based on joint ownership
• Contracts for security adaptation
• MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS
• Renegotiation of Sales Contracts
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers
• On renegotiation-proof equilibria in finitely repeated games
• Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency
• Communicating subjective evaluations
• A theory of disagreement in repeated games with bargaining
• Intraplay communication in repeated games
• Robust contracts with one-sided commitment

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• repgames

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