Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009zbMath1281.91021OpenAlexW2068761509MaRDI QIDQ2435898

Susanne Goldlücke, Sebastian Kranz

Publication date: 21 February 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

infinitely repeated gamesrenegotiationside paymentsoptimal penal codes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations

Uses Software

• repgames

Cites Work

• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry
• The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games with side-payments
• The maximum efficient equilibrium payoff in the repeated prisoners' dilemma.
• A note on renegotiation in repeated Bertrand duopolies
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

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