Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
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Publication:2435898
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009zbMath1281.91021OpenAlexW2068761509MaRDI QIDQ2435898
Susanne Goldlücke, Sebastian Kranz
Publication date: 21 February 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.009
Related Items (4)
Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers ⋮ MORAL HAZARD IN REMOTE TEAMS ⋮ Renegotiation-proof relational contracts ⋮ Communicating subjective evaluations
Uses Software
Cites Work
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- Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
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