Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
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Publication:4551444
DOI10.1162/003355302753399445zbMath1002.91041OpenAlexW3124719057MaRDI QIDQ4551444
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Publication date: 15 January 2003
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445
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