Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

DOI10.1162/003355302753399445zbMATH Open1002.91041OpenAlexW3124719057MaRDI QIDQ4551444FDOQ4551444

Authors:

Publication date: 15 January 2003

Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399445

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zbMATH Keywords

integrationrelational contractsfirmsrepeated-game models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cited In (35)

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• Building trust: the costs and benefits of gradualism
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• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
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• Relational contracts and the first-order approach
• Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth
• Using an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option to study alliance behavior: results of a tournament and simulation
• Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
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• A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
• Repeated interaction and its impact on cooperation and surplus allocation -- an experimental analysis
• OPTIMAL PAYMENT CONTRACTS IN TRADE RELATIONSHIPS
• Renegotiation-proof relational contracts
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• The agency costs of on-the-job search
• Relational contracts in a persistent environment
• Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R\&D alliances.
• A theory of firm scope
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• The interaction between explicit and relational incentives: an experiment
• Partnerships based on joint ownership
• Competition and relational contracts in the Rwanda coffee chain
• Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
• Multilateral Contracting and the Employment Relationship
• Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent

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