Implicit contracting with a (potentially) reliable agent

DOI10.1007/s00712-008-0023-1zbMath1142.91637OpenAlexW1964863542WikidataQ123024884 ScholiaQ123024884MaRDI QIDQ943879

Oliver Gürtler

Publication date: 12 September 2008

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-008-0023-1

zbMATH Keywords

Implicit contractingPoolingReliable agentSeparating

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Bad Reputation
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts