Reputation and imperfect information

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8zbMath0485.90093OpenAlexW2128168853WikidataQ56481645 ScholiaQ56481645MaRDI QIDQ1164554

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect information multistage games finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma reputation effect Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

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