A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90032-8zbMath0587.90107OpenAlexW2019984975MaRDI QIDQ1072945

B. George

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90032-8

zbMATH Keywords

limit equilibriaperfect equilibriumconvergence of equilibriaconvergence with respect to a topologyinfinite extensive gameinfinite horizon gameslimit strategiestruncated games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (11)

Limit games and limit equilibria ⋮ Forecast horizons for a class of dynamic games ⋮ Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games ⋮ Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. ⋮ Maximal strategy sets for continuous-time game theory ⋮ ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Dynamic price competition ⋮ Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets ⋮ Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information ⋮ Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

Cites Work

• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

This page was built for publication: A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games