Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities.
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Publication:1429920
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00122-2zbMath1085.91501MaRDI QIDQ1429920
Publication date: 27 May 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
equilibriumDynamic gamesTarski's fixed point theoremSupermodular gamesStrategic complementaritiesSubgame-perfect
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