The limit of targeting in networks
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Publication:2138068
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2022.105418zbMath1490.91027OpenAlexW4213037972MaRDI QIDQ2138068
Ying-Ju Chen, Junjie Zhou, Jian Li
Publication date: 11 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105418
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Cites Work
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