Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0186-3MaRDI QIDQ2642885zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jan Potters, M. Sefton, L. Vesterlund

Publication date 6 September 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0186-3

zbMATH Keywords

Public goodsReciprocitySignalingLeading-by-exampleVoluntary provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility
• Bounded rationality in laboratory bargaining with asymmetric information
• What makes an allocation fair? Some experimental evidence.

Cited in

(21)

• Conditional cooperation and the marginal per capita return in public good games
• Signaling managerial objectives to elicit volunteer effort
• Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
• Words versus actions as a means to influence cooperation in social dilemma situations
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1594536 (Why is no real title available?)
• Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence
• Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
• The limit of targeting in networks
• What happens if you single out? An experiment
• Should I stay or should I go? Congestion pricing and equilibrium selection in a transportation network
• Leadership and the effective choice of information regime
• Who are the voluntary leaders? Experimental evidence from a sequential contribution game
• Relative social status and conformism: experimental evidence on local public good contributions
• Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
• Pricing strategies and mechanism choice in reward-based crowdfunding
• An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory
• Leading by example versus leading by words in voluntary contribution experiments
• Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: a within-subjects analysis
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
• Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity
• To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games

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