Leadership and the effective choice of information regime

DOI10.1007/S11238-016-9554-ZMaRDI QIDQ683818zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Mana Komai, Philip J. Grossman, Evelyne Benie

Publication date 9 February 2018

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9554-z

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationfree-ridingleadershiptransparency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Recommendations

• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• Communication, leadership and coordination failure
• Noisy leadership: An experimental approach
• To lead or not to lead. Endogenous sequencing in public goods games
• Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs

Cites work

• Altruism in anonymous dictator games
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
• Leadership Style and Incentives
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

Cited in

(1)

• Leadership, coordination, and corporate culture

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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