Leadership and the effective choice of information regime

DOI10.1007/s11238-016-9554-zzbMath1395.91067OpenAlexW2409823372WikidataQ57455715 ScholiaQ57455715MaRDI QIDQ683818

Evelyne Benie, Mana Komai, Philip J. Grossman

Publication date: 9 February 2018

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9554-z

zbMATH Keywords

coordinationleadershipfree-ridingtransparency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs
• Altruism in anonymous dictator games
• Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
• Leadership Style and Incentives
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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